REMEDIES-Toxic TORTS-RECOVERY DENIED FOR UNQUANTIFIED "ENHANCED RISK" OF DISEASE UNDER NEWJERSEY TORT
CLAIMS ACT AND PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF A COURT-SUPERVISED FUND FOR MEDICAL SURVEILLANCE COMPENSATION

REQUIRED-Ayers v. Township of Jackson,

A.2d 287 (1987).

a

106 N.J. 557, 525

In recent years, courts have faced the dilemma of determining adequate compensation for victims injured by exposure to
toxic chemicals in accordance with common law tort principles.'
I G. NOTHSTEIN, Toxic TORTS § 11.01 (1984). The common law theories of
liability upon which most toxic tort litigation is premised include trespass, nuisance, negligence, strict liability and warranty. Id. at § § 11.01-11.17. See also Note,
The Inapplicability of Traditional Tort Analysis to Environmental Risks: The Example of
Toxic Waste Pollution Victim Compensation, 35 STAN. L. REV. 575, 579-88 (1983).
Two major characteristics of toxic tort injuries that distinguish them from
traditional personal injury torts, thereby rendering resolution of these cases more
difficult are: (1) the prolonged time period between the tortious act and the manifestation of injury and (2) the indeterminacy of the cause of injury. Id. at 587. Furthermore, time is one of the foremost problems confronting both toxic tort victims
and the courts. Ginsberg & Weiss, Common Law Liability For Toxic Torts: A Phantom
Remedy, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 859, 925 (1981). Even if plaintiffs are able to overcome
the technical obstacles presented by statutes of limitation and legal causation
proofs, adequate compensation can hardly be obtained from an unidentifiable or
financially irresponsible defendant. See id. at 925-26. These difficulties occur more
frequently in toxic tort litigation primarily because of the extended time span between the act of contamination and the discovery or manifestation of injury. See
SENATE COMMITrEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., Six
CASE STUDIES OF COMPENSATION FOR Toxic

SUBSTANCES POLLUTION: ALABAMA,

CAL-

(Comm. Print 1980)
of scientists, economists, lawyers, legal researchers and policy analysts, conducted an interdisciplinary
study of the tort law systems of six representative states. Id. at 1. The area of
primary concentration involved the compensation sought, awarded, or potentially
available for toxic chemical related injuries. Id. The results of the study indicated
that the legal mechanisms available in the specific states studied were generally
inadequate as a means for compensating the victims of toxic chemical exposure
cases. Id. at xii-xv. For example, traditional tort law requires proof that exposure
to the toxic chemicals proximately caused the alleged harm. See id. at xv. The prolonged latency periods of the diseases associated with toxic chemical exposure
render this requisite proof virtually impossible. See id. The study team further
determined that individuals exposed to toxic substances rarely filed suit, and of the
suits instituted, very few reached final judgment. Id. This was primarily attributed
to the complex technical issues and the high costs of litigating toxic tort cases. Id.
The final conclusion of the researchers was that in most instances, the injured parties were undercompensated. Id. For example, most settlement agreements generally prohibited subsequent suits if the latent diseases eventually manifested
themselves. Id. at xvi.
The inadequacy of compensation in these cases is further demonstrated by a
review of the case study conducted in New Jersey. In 1974, waste disposed of by
Union Carbide in Dover Township, New Jersey, caused the toxic chemical contamiIFORNIA, MICHIGAN, MISSOURI, NEW JERSEY, AND TEXAS, xii-xvi
[hereinafter Six CASE STUDIES]. A research team, comprised
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Our judicial system has been struggling, in the absence of legislative assistance,2 to adapt conventional tort doctrines to the
unique characteristics of toxic tort litigation.3 The major enigma
confronting courts is the determination of compensable damages
nation of the groundwater and subsequently the pollution of 148 private wells. Id.
at xiv. The chemicals were determined to be carcinogenic, mutagenic and teratogenic. Id. While the amount of recovery requested by the plaintiffs was kept confidential, the case settled for only $200,000. Id.
2 See Zazzali & Grad, Hazardous Wastes: New Rights and Remedies?, 13 SETON HALL
L. REV. 446, 458-463 (1983). The authors acknowledged the non-existence of federal statutory private rights of action for personal injuries resulting from hazardous
chemical exposure. Id. at 458.
See also Spill Compensation and Control Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.1 l(g)
(West Supp. 1988) (imposing liability for cleanup costs and damage to property but
not including a compensation scheme for personal injuries); Water Pollution Control Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:1OA-10 (West Supp. 1988) (authorizing the commissioner to bring a civil action for specified types of relief); Environmental Cleanup
Responsibility Act, NJ. STAT. ANN. § 13: lK-13(a) (West Supp. 1988) (providing for
strict liability but only regarding cleanup costs and failure to implement a cleanup
plan); Environmental Rights Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:35A-4 (West 1987) (creating
a private cause of action limited to the enforcement of the environmental laws).
A similar omission is exemplified in the federal legislation. See, e.g., The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9657 (1982) (no provisions for the compensation of personal injuries
caused by exposure to toxic substances).
3 Trauberman, Statutory Reform of "Toxic Torts ": Relieving Legal, Scientific, and Economic Burdens On The Chemical Victim, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 177, 188-202 (1983).
Many victims of toxic chemical exposure do not know that they have been injured,
and therefore, do not seek compensation until they have physical manifestations of
symptoms. See id. at 191. This could potentially be as long as 15-30 years after
exposure. See id. A few states still retain the traditional rule which starts the running of the statute of limitations at the time of initial exposure to the toxic substances. See id. at 192 & n.68. The majority of jurisdictions, however, have enacted
some form of the "discovery rule" either by statute or judicial interpretation which
tolls the statute until an injured party discovers or reasonably should have discovered the injury. Id. at 191 & n.65.
A further hindrance to toxic tort plaintiffs is the traditional concept of reasonableness which pervades actions under negligence and nuisance. Id. at 192-197. In
general, a determination of reasonableness requires the balancing of risks and benefits of a behavior. See id. & nn.69-78. A plaintiff has the burden to prove that the
defendant's conduct unreasonably exposed him to a toxic substance. Id. at 194.
The absence of regulatory standards concerning many toxic substances at the time
of their disposal is taken into consideration on the issue of reasonableness. Id.
A plaintiff must also overcome the obstacle of causation. Id. at 197. A plaintiff
is required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the conduct of the
defendant proximately caused his injury. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON &
D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]. In toxic tort litigation, the proof of causation necessitates the use of experts in the fields of toxicology, epidemiology and other related
disciplines. Trauberman, supra, at 198. These scientific experts generally couch
their opinions in terms of statistical probabilities. See id. Thejudicial system, how-
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based on post-exposure, pre-symptom injuries. Historically,
there has been a reluctance to recognize claims for potential injury unless there is substantial proof that the injury will occur. 5
Notwithstanding the advancements of scientific and medical
knowledge in the area of toxic chemical exposure and its implications on human health, proof of potential future disease remains
unquantifiable and will continue to be a recurring issue.6
In Ayers v. Township of Jackson,7 the New Jersey Supreme
Court addressed the viability of four distinct damage claims
under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act for injuries caused by exposure to toxic chemicals.' In 1972, Jackson Township commenced operation of the Legler landfill pursuant to a conditional
permit issued by the New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection (DEP).9 The township, however, failed to operate the
landfill in compliance with the permit conditions imposed by the
ever, has been reluctant to accept such probalistic evidence as sufficient proof of
causation. See id. at 198-99 & nn.103-12.
For a general discussion of the major obstacles confronting toxic tort victims
see G. NOTHSTEIN, supra note 1, § 23.07, at 693-97.
4 Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 106 N.J. 557, 587-88, 525 A.2d 287, 302-03
(1987). The injury occurs at the time of exposure to the toxic chemicals since the
genetic material within individual cells is affected at that time. Id. at 589, 525 A.2d
at 303. The exposure begins a process which 20 to 30 years later manifests itself as
a cancer or other disease. See id. at 589 n.8, 525 A.2d at 303 n.8. See generally G.
NOTHSTEIN, supra note 1, § 17.02, at 495-97; § 26.07 at 695-97 (discussion of reasonable certainty requirement, proof of injury and latency periods).
5 See G. NOTHSTEIN, supra note 1, at 495. Traditionally, the standard of proof
on the issue of damages required that damages be established with certainty. See id.
This harsh standard has been modified to its present state of requiring that the
element of damages be established with reasonable certainty. See id. at 496 (emphasis
in original). See also Evers v. Dollinger, 95 N.J. 399, 417, 471 A.2d 405, 415 (1984)
(holding that plaintiff should be permitted to demonstrate "within a reasonable
degree of medical probability" that the defendant's malpractice did in fact increase
her risk of cancer recurrence and that the increased risk was a substantial cause of
her present condition).
6 Ayers, 106 N.J. at 579, 525 A.2d at 298. See generally G. NOTHSTEIN, supra note
1, § 16.05 (discussion of compensation for possible future injuries).
7 106 N.J. 557, 525 A.2d 287 (1987).
8 See id. at 565-66, 525 A.2d at 291. The claims considered were damages for
emotional distress, deterioration of the quality of life, enhanced risk of disease and
the cost of future medical surveillance. Id. The New Jersey Tort Claims Act provides in pertinent part that "public entities shall only be liable for their negligence
within the limitations of this act and in accordance with the fair and uniform principles established herein." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:1-2 (West 1982).
9 Ayers, 106 N.J. at 567, 525 A.2d at 292. The permit issued by the DEP prohibited the disposal of liquid and soluble industrial wastes at the Legler landfill. Id.
The DEP further imposed depth limitations restricting the depth of refuse deposits
to a specified grade above the groundwater level. Id.
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DEP.' ° Consequently, the township's conduct resulted in contamination of the surrounding groundwater and the residents'
wells with a variety of toxic chemicals." In November 1978, six
years after the township began operation of the Legler landfill,
residents in the area were informed by the board of health that
their well water was unsafe for consumption.' 2 They were further cautioned by the board to limit their bathing and washing in
3
order to reduce their exposure to the contaminated water.'
In response to the problem, Jackson Township provided
tanks of potable water at various neighborhood locations. 14 The
township soon replaced this initial system with a home delivery
arrangement, whereby barrels of clean water were delivered to
the residents' homes as needed. 1 5 The plaintiffs16obtained water
in this manner for a period of nearly two years.
Three hundred thirty-nine residents ofJackson Township instituted suit in the New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division,
against the municipality for damages resulting from the contamination of their well water.' 7 The plaintiffs asserted damage
claims for emotional distress,' 8 diminished quality of life,' 9 en10 Id. The township failed to monitor the wastes deposited at the Legler landfill
and ignored the depth limitations specifically required by the DEP permit. Id.
'' Id. at 567-68, 525 A.2d at 292. The chemicals found in the plaintiffs' well
water
included:
"acetone;
benzene;
chlorobenzene;
chloroform;
dichlorofluoromethane; ethylbenzene; methylene chloride; methyl isobutyl ketone;
1,1,2, 2-tetrachloroethane; tetrahydrofuran; 1,1,1-trichloroethane; and trichloroethylene." Id. An expert in the field of geohydrology testified at trial concerning
the manner in which the substances deposited at the landfill migrated to the plaintiffs' wells. Id. at 568, 525 A.2d at 292.
12 Id. at 569, 525 A.2d at 293. See infra notes 37-54 and accompanying text for a
discussion of claims for diminished quality of life.
13 Ayers, 106 N.J. at 569, 525 A.2d at 293.
14 Id. Those residents in need of water brought their own containers, filled
them from the water tanks, and then transported the water to their homes. Id.
15 Id. The water was delivered in 40 gallon barrels weighing over 100 pounds
each. Id. The residents frequently had to relocate the barrels to protected areas
either inside their homes or garages. Id. Occasionally, replacement barrels were
required because of debris in the water. Id. Additionally, the water stored in garages often froze in cold weather. Id.
16 Id. at 570, 525 A.2d at 293.
17 See id. at 565, 525 A.2d at 291.
18 Id. at 572-73, 525 A.2d at 294-95. The plaintiffs alleged emotional distress
resulting from the knowledge that they had ingested contaminated water for six
years. Id. A clinical psychologist found that increased levels of depression, stress,
concern for physical health and psychological disorders existed in a group of 88
plaintiffs. Id. at 573, 525 A.2d at 295.
19 Id. at 565, 525 A.2d at 291. The plaintiffs asserted a diminished quality of life
charge, caused by their deprivation of running water for a period of 20 months. Id.
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hanced risk of disease, 2 ° and medical surveillance. 2 1 The jury
found that Jackson Township had operated the Legler landfill in
a "palpably unreasonable" manner, thereby fulfilling an essential
condition of recovery under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act. 22
20 Id. at 566, 525 A.2d at 291. The plaintiffs alleged an enhanced risk of disease
resulting from their prolonged exposure to the toxic chemicals. See id. at 568, 525
A.2d at 292. Toxicologist testimony identified the potential physiological effects of
toxic chemical exposure, which included kidney and liver damage, genetic mutations, blood disorders, injury to the reproductive system, neurological damage, skin
irritations and varying types of cancer. See id.
21 Id. at 599, 525 A.2d at 308-09. The plaintiffs requested damages for the cost
of future medical care necessary to monitor their health for early detection of cancer and other diseases resulting from their exposure to the toxic chemicals. Id., 525
A.2d at 308. Testimony supplied by a medical expert recommended periodic medical testing for a period of one to three years after exposure in order to establish
baseline data. Id., 525 A.2d at 309. Thereafter, annual medical exams would not
be necessary until ten years after the exposure, which is representative of the latency period. See id. at 599 n.12, 525 A.2d at 309 n.12.
22 Id. at 565, 525 A.2d at 291. In order to recover under the New Jersey Tort
Claims Act, the defendant's conduct must be found "palpably unreasonable." See
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:4-2 (West 1982). The statute provides that:
A public entity is liable for injury caused by a condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by
the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and
that ....

b. a public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under section 59:4-3 a sufficient time prior to the injury to
have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.
Nothing in this section shall be construed to impose liability upon a
public entity for a dangerous condition of its public property if the action the entity took to protect against the condition or the failure to take
such action was not palpably unreasonable.
Id. (emphasis added). This represents a more stringent requirement than ordinary
negligence. See J. FITZPATRICK, GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY UNDER THE NEW JERSEY
TORT CLAIMS ACT 29 (1981) (quoting Williams v. Phillipsburg, 171 N.J. Super. 278,
408 A.2d 827 (App. Div. 1979)). In Williams, the appellate division stated that "the
duty of ordinary care, the breach of which is termed negligence, differs in degree
from the duty to refrain from palpably unreasonable conduct. The latter standard
implies a more obvious and manifest breach of duty and imposes a more onerous
burden on the plaintiff." Williams v. Phillipsburg, 171 N.J. Super. 278, 286, 408
A.2d 827, 831 (App. Div. 1979).
The New Jersey Supreme Court originated the term "palpably unreasonable"
in the pre-Act case of Bergen v. Koppenal, 52 N.J. 478, 480, 246 A.2d 442, 444
(1968), but failed to offer an explanation of its meaning. The term is also not defined in the Tort Claims Act; however, the Law Division presented a definition in
Polyard v. Terry, 148 N.J. Super. 202, 372 A.2d 378 (Law Div. 1978), rev'd on other
grounds, 160 N.J. Super. 497, 390 A.2d 653 (App. Div. 1978), aff'd, 79 N.J. 547, 401
A.2d 532 (1979). In his charge to the jury, the trial judge stated
[t]he term "palpably unreasonable" in this particular context means
plainly, obviously, patently, distinctly or manifestly unreasonable. For a
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The jury further determined-that the township's conduct created
a "dangerous condition," constituted a "nuisance," and proximately caused the contamination of the plaintiffs' well water.2 3
Damages were awarded as compensation for emotional distress,
24
diminished quality of life, and future medical surveillance costs.
The trial court dismissed the claim for enhanced risk of disease.2 5
On appeal, the appellate division affirmed the damage award
for diminished quality of life and upheld the trial court's rejecpublic entity to have acted or failed to act in a fashion which is palpably
unreasonable, it must be manifest and obvious that no prudent person
would approve of its course of action or inaction.
Polyard, 148 N.J. Super, at 216, 372 A.2d at 385.
For additional applications of the term "palpably unreasonable" see
Birchwood Lakes Colony Club, Inc. v. Borough of Medford Lakes, 90 N.J. 582, 596,
449 A.2d 472, 479 (1982) (public entity's conduct or omission to act must be shown
to be palpably unreasonable); Brown v. Brown, 86 N.J. 565, 575, 432 A.2d 493, 498
(1981) (even if requisite conditions to liability are established, plaintiff could not
prevail unless it was also shown that defendant's acts or omissions were "palpably
unreasonable"); Fox v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Twp., 199 N.J. Super. 82, 90-91, 488
A.2d 557, 562 (App. Div. 1985) (plaintiff bears burden to prove that defendant's
action was "palpably unreasonable"); McGowan v. Borough of Eatontown, 151 NJ.
Super. 440, 448, 376 A.2d 1327, 1331 (App. Div. 1977) (court determined that the
issue was "whether the [sitate's failure to salt and sand when having constructive
notice from the local police of the formation of the ice in cold weather [was] 'palpably unreasonable' ").
23 Ayers, 106 N.J. at 565, 525 A.2d at 291. "Dangerous condition" is defined by
the Act as "a condition of property that creates a substantial risk of injury when
such property is used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:4-1(a) (West 1982). See supra note
22 for the text of § 59:4-2 setting forth the requisite proofs necessary to establish
the liability of a public entity. See also Birchwood Lakes Colony Club, 90 N.J. at 593, 449
A.2d at 478 (1982) (municipality can be held liable under a nuisance cause of action
for water pollution). See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, §§ 87-88 (discussion of the nuisance doctrine).
24 Ayers, 106 N.J. at 565-66, 525 A.2d at 291. The jury established varying individual damage awards based on such factors as degree and duration of exposure,
proximity to the landfill, and age of the plaintiff. Id. at 565, 525 A.2d at 291. Damages were awarded in the amounts of $2,056,480 for the emotional distress claim,
$5,396,940 for impairment of their quality of life, $8,204,500 for future costs of
medical surveillance and $196,500 for miscellaneous expenses. Id. at 565-66, 525
A.2d at 291. The trial court reduced the total award by $850,000, the amount of a
pre-trial settlement with the Jackson Township engineer. Id. at 566, 525 A.2d at
291.
25 Id. The court determined that the risk of future disease was far too speculative. Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 189 N.J. Super. 561, 568, 461 A.2d 184, 187
(Law Div. 1983), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 202 N.J. Super. 106, 493 A.2d 1314 (App.
Div. 1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 106 N.J. 557, 525 A.2d 287 (1987). The court
noted that none of the plaintiffs' experts offered an opinion on the probability that
any of the individual plaintiffs would develop the diseases for which they were at
risk. Id. at 566-67, 461 A.2d at 187 (emphasis added).
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tion of the plaintiffs' claim for enhanced risk of disease. 26 The
appellate division, however, reversed the lower court's judgments for emotional distress damages and future medical surveillance expenses.2 7 The court affirmed the judgment reduction
based on a pre-trial settlement.28
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification to examine the claims dismissed by the appellate division and to reconsider the trial court's award of damages. 29 The court affirmed
the dismissal of the claims for emotional distress and enhanced
risk of disease. 30 Additionally, the court sustained the judgment
for diminished quality of life damages 3 I and reinstated the jury
verdict for medical surveillance damages. 2
Conventional tort law damage awards are intended to provide compensation for injury proximately caused by a defendant's conduct.33 Determination of damages requires application
of judicially established rules for the specific type of injury incurred.34 While common law tort theories have continued to
evolve in response to societal changes, 35 they are uniquely challenged by the damage claims emanating from toxic tort injuries.36 In order to facilitate a fundamental understanding of the
distinct field of legal development represented by each of the
four damage claims of the Ayers plaintiffs, each principle area of
compensation will be addressed independently.
Ayers, 106 N.J. at 566, 525 A.2d at 291.
Id. The appellate division concluded that emotional distress was equivalent
to "pain and suffering," thereby precluding recovery under the New Jersey Tort
Claims Act. Ayers, 202 N.J. Super. at 116, 493 A.2d at 1319. The Act specifically
prohibits recovery from a public entity for pain and suffering unless the litigation
involves "permanent loss of a bodily function, permanent disfigurement or dismemberment where the medical treatment expenses are in excess of $1,000.00."
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:9-2(d) (West 1982). The court's rejection of the award for
future medical surveillance was premised upon its conclusion that the probability of
the plaintiffs' contracting cancer or some other related disease was too remote to
warrant imposition of extensive medical costs on the defendant. Ayers, 202 N.J.
Super. at 122, 493 A.2d at 1323.
28 Ayers, 106 N.J. at 566, 525 A.2d at 291.
29 Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 102 N.J. 306, 508 A.2d 191 (1985).
30 Ayers, 106 N.J. at 577, 598-99, 525 A.2d at 297, 308.
31 Id. at 572, 525 A.2d at 294.
32 Id. at 611, 525 A.2d at 315:
33 See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.1 (1973); Towards a
Jurisprudenceof Injury: The ContinuingCreation of a System of SubstantiveJustice in American
Tort Law, Report to the A.B.A., 4-29 - 4-37 (1984).
34 See D. DOBBS, supra note 33, at 138.
35 See Ginsberg & Weiss, supra note 1, at 899.
36 See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
26
27
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DIMINISHED QUALITY OF LIFE

The disposal of toxic substances frequently results in an interference with individual property interests. 37 The law of nuisance, therefore, represents a valid Cause of action for those
claims emanating from interferences with proprietary interests.3 8
Historically, the doctrine of nuisance was considered an intentional tort; however, the Restatement (Second) of Torts has extended
the doctrine beyond the intentional interference category3 9 to include accidental invasions which would be actionable under theories of negligence 4° and strict liability.4" In essence, toxic tort
damage claims premised upon a nuisance theory require establishment of both the tortious nature of the defendant's
conduct
42
and the substantial invasion of a property right.
37 See G. NOTHSTEIN, supra note 1, at 325-27; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, at
627; Ginsberg & Weiss, supra note 1, at 883-886.
38 Ayers, 106 N.J. at 571-72, 525 A.2d at 294.
In order for a cause of action to be maintained under a private nuisance theory,
it must be shown that:
(1) The defendant acted with the intent of interfering with the use and
enjoyment of the land by those entitled to that use;
(2) There was some interference with the use and enjoyment of the land
of the kind intended, although the amount and extent of that interference may not have been anticipated or intended;
(3) The interference that resulted and the physical harm, if any, from
that interference proved to be substantial... ;
(4) The interference that came about under such circumstances was of
such a nature, duration or amount as to constitute unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of the land.
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, at 622-23.
39 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1977). The Restatement provides that:
One is subject to liability for a private nuisance if, but only if, his conduct is a legal cause of an invasion of another's interest in the private
use and enjoyment of land, and the invasion is either
(a) intentional and unreasonable, or
(b) unintentional and otherwise actionable under the rules controlling liability for negligent or reckless conduct, or for abnormally dangerous conditions or activities.
Id.
Environmental pollution is an example of a nuisance claim which involves an
interference with a property interest and yet is most likely unintended. Even
though a landfill is intentionally created, the harm caused by the migration of contaminants is an unintended occurrence. See Ginsberg & Weiss, supra note 1, at 885.
40 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965); Ginsberg & Weiss, supra
note 1, at 886-88.
41 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1976) which provides for strict
liability for abnormally dangerous activities. The determination of whether an activity is abnormally dangerous requires a balancing of risk-utility factors. Id.
42 See Ginsberg & Weiss, supra note 1, at 884 nn.100-03. See also New Jersey
Dep't Envt'l Protection v. Exxon Corp., 151 N.J. Super. 464, 482, 376 A.2d 1339,
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Diminished quality of life has long been recognized as an appropriate item of damages under the law of nuisance. 43 In Dixon
v. New York Trap Rock Corp. ,44 the court determined that the defendant's blasting operation unreasonably interfered with the
plaintiff's property rights. 4 5 The plaintiff in Dixon sought recovery for her state of anxiety directly caused by the nuisance.4 6 The
New York Court of Appeals held that such damages were appropriate since "discomfort and inconvenience caused by the disturbance of the property are valid grounds of recovery in an action
'47
for a nuisance.
The rationale behind this well-established legal principle 48
was explained in Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corp.4 9 Velsicol Chemical Corp. owned and operated a chemical waste landfill which
caused personal injuries and damage to the plaintiffs' property
when hazardous chemicals escaped from the burial site and contaminated the plaintiffs' well water.5" The plaintiffs premised
1348 (Ch. Div. 1977) (stating that in order to establish a nuisance, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that "there has been an unreasonable, unwarranted or unlawful use by
a person of his real property which is resulting in a material annoyance, inconvenience or hurt.") (citation omitted).
43 See D. DOBBS, supra note 33, § 5.3, at 334; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3,
§ 89, at 639; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 929 (1977) (creating a category of
compensation for "discomfort and annoyance" as a result of interference with a
property interest). See, e.g., Kornoff v. Kingsburg Cotton Oil Co., 45 Cal. 2d 265,
273-275, 288 P.2d 507, 512-13 (1955) (the disbursement of fumes, dust, dirt, lint
and sediment from the defendant's cotton gin, which traveled into the plaintiffs'
home, caused them discomfort and annoyance); Miller v. Carnation Co., 39 Colo.
App. 1, 4, 564 P.2d 127, 130 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that the plaintiffs
suffered annoyance and discomfort from the continual invasion of their property by
flies and rodents from the defendant's adjoining poultry ranch).
44 293 N.Y. 509, 58 N.E.2d 517 (1944).
45 Id. at 513, 58 N.E.2d at 517. The defendant's blasting vibrated the earth and
caused actual damage to the plaintiffs' home. Id. The damage not only diminished
the value of the property but also interfered with the plaintiffs' enjoyment of it. Id.
46 Id. at 514, 58 N.E.2d at 518. The plaintiff was in a constant state of anxiety
and fear over the blasting and its effect on her home. Id.
47 Id.
48 See Alonso v. Hills, 95 Cal. App. 2d 778, 214 P.2d 50 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950)
(stating that plaintiff's fear for the safety of himself and his family caused by the
defendant's blasting were a type of discomfort recoverable under a nuisance theory); Nitram Chems. Inc. v. Parker, 200 So. 2d 220 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (holding that recovery for annoyance, inconvenience, discomfort and illness was
permitted where it was determined that the fumes, dust and noises from the defendant's plant constituted a nuisance); Vestal v. Gulf Oil Corp., 149 Tex. 487, 235
S.W.2d 440 (1951) (holding that recovery for personal discomfort and annoyance
included the fear and anxiety caused by the presence of gasoline fumes in their
home which escaped from defendant's property).
49 647 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Tenn. 1986).
50 Id. at 306. The plaintiffs claimed that Velsicol was grossly negligent in the
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their damage claims on the doctrines of nuisance, trespass, negligence and strict liability.5 Upon consideration of the nuisance
theory, the court determined that Velsicol's actions constituted
an interference with the plaintiffs' property rights of use and enjoyment. 52 In analyzing the compensable elements of the damage claims, the Sterling court reasoned that the gravamen of the
nuisance doctrine was the interference with the everyday lives of
the residents. 53 Therefore, the court held that damages "for the
disruption in the quality of [the plaintiffs'] lives caused by the
wrongdoing of defendants" were recoverable.5 4
II.

EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

The concept of recovery for emotional distress, while continuing to be a subject of controversy, has undergone a substantial
metamorphosis. 5 5 In those instances where a defendant's conduct causes an immediate physical injury to the plaintiff, the
courts have allowed compensation for the purely psychological
elements of damage. 5 6 An early New Jersey decision exemplifying the principle that in the absence of physical injury a plaintiff
could not recover for emotional distress is Ward v. West Jersey &
Seashore R. R. 5 7 Ward involved a claim for damages arising from
the emotional distress injury sustained by the plaintiff when he
manner in which it selected the location for the landfill. Id. at 308. They further
contended that the defendant's failure to contain the chemicals in corrosion resistent drums enhanced the leaking and migration of the pollutants into the groundwater. Id.
51 Id. at 309. The plaintiffs asserted that the operation of the toxic landfill constituted an abnormally dangerous activity and was an unnatural use of the property.
Id. They also claimed that Velsicol permitted the toxic chemicals to escape from
the landfill site which resulted in harm to the plaintiffs' persons and property. Id.
52 Id. at 319. The court acknowledged that a claim of nuisance could be established by showing "that the defendant has created or continued the condition causing the nuisance with full knowledge that the harm to the plaintiffs' interest [was]
substantially bound to follow therefrom." Id. at 320. The court further noted that
a nuisance could result from merely negligent conduct where the defendant failed
to implement precautions against a danger which a reasonable man would have
protected against. Id. Lastly, the court maintained that a nuisance could result
from abnormally dangerous activities. Id.
53 Id. at 321.
54 Id.

55 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, § 54, at 359-67.
56 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, at 363 & nn.33-37. The rationale behind
permitting this recovery is that the physical injury presents assurances that the
emotional injury is real. Id.
57 65 N.J.L. 383, 47 A. 561 (Sup. Ct. 1900), overruled, 45 N.J. 559, 214 A.2d 12
(1965). The Falzone court specifically concluded that Ward "should no longer be
followed in NewJersey." Id. at 569, 214 A.2d at 17.
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was permitted, through the negligence of the defendant's employee, to drive on a railroad crossing into the path of an approaching train. 58 Although the plaintiff feared for his safety, he
was not actually physically injured. 59 He did, however, experience physical symptoms as a result of his emotional trauma.60 In
resolving the issue of "whether, in an action for negligence, the
mere apprehension of personal injuries, which are not in fact received, [would] support an action, when physical suffering follows as a consequence of the mental disturbance" the court
relied on the decisions of neighboring jurisdictions. 6' Based on

the consensus of opinion, the court ruled that such injuries were
62
non-actionable.

The traditional rule requiring physical impact as a pre-requisite to recovery for emotional distress damages 63 was rejected by
the New Jersey Supreme Court in Falzone v. Busch. 6 The plaintiff
58 Ward, 65 N.J.L. at 383, 47 A. at 561. The defendant railroad's gatekeeper
lowered the railroad crossing gates before the plaintiff's vehicle was completely
over the railroad tracks. Id.
59 Id. at 384, 47 A. at 561.
60 Id. at 383, 47 A. at 561.
61 Id. at 384-85, 47 A. at 561-62 (citing Wyman v. Leavitt, 71 Me. 227 (1880)
(mental anxiety without physical injury is not an element of damages); Spade v.
Lynn & Boston R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897) (no recovery for a personal
injury caused merely by fright and psychological disturbance); Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (Ct. App. 1896) (defendant's negligent operation of a horse-car which subjected the plaintiff to fright which subsequently
caused the plaintiff to suffer a miscarriage held insufficient to maintain a cause of
action since unaccompanied by immediate physical injury)).
62 Id. at 386, 47 A. at 562.
If the right of recovery in this class of cases should be once established,
it would naturally result in a flood of litigations in cases where the injury
complained of may be easily feigned without detection, and where the
damages must rest upon mere conjecture and speculation. The difficulty which often exists in cases of alleged physical injuries, in determining whether they exist, and, if so, whether they were caused by the
negligent act of the defendant, would not only be greatly increased, but
a wide field would be opened for unrighteous or speculative claims.
Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N.Y. 107, 110, 45 N.E. 354, 354-55
(Ct. App. 1896)).
63 See Tuttle v. Atlantic City R.R., 66 N.J.L. 327, 332, 49 A. 450, 451 (i901)
(holding that if a defendant negligently places the plaintiff "under a reasonable
apprehension of personal physical injury, and plaintiff, in a reasonable effort to
escape, sustains physical injury," recovery is permitted for the physical injury plus
the emotional distress which naturally flows from the physical injury); Greenberg v.
Stanley, 51 N.J. Super. 90, 105-06, 143 A.2d 588, 597 (App. Div. 1958), modified on
other grounds, 30 N.J. 485, 153 A.2d 833 (1959) (concluding that where some physical injury to a person results from defendant's negligence, no matter how slight, the
individual may recover for her entire physical and emotional injuries).
64 45 N.J. 559, 214 A.2d 12 (1965).
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in Falzone was seated in her parked car when the defendant's motor vehicle veered across the roadway heading directly towards
the plaintiff's car.6 5 Although no physical impact actually occurred, the plaintiff feared for her safety. 66 The court ruled that
recovery for emotional distress would be appropriate so long as
the defendant's negligence created the potential for physical
harm.67

One year later, in Caputzal v. The Lindsay Co. ,68 the court distinguished between emotional harm resulting from the reasonable fear of physical injury and unnatural psychological trauma,
which causes unforeseeable physical consequences.6 9 In Caputzal,
the plaintiff suffered a heart attack after he became emotionally
distraught as a result of consuming discolored water, which he
feared was poisoned. 7' The court, in explaining its Falzone holding, stated that recovery should be permissible in cases involving
emotional injury without physical impact only if the emotional
harm was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant's conduct. 7 '
A slightly different aspect of emotional distress injury was
addressed in Berman v. Allan.7 2 In Berman, the parents of a
Down's Syndrome child brought an action for wrongful birth.75
Specifically, the parents sought recovery for the emotional
trauma they sustained upon discovering that their child was inflicted with Down's Syndrome. 4 Their claim was unique in that
it was not based on any causal relationship between the child's
condition and the physician's treatment, but rather on the theory
Id. at 561, 214 A.2d at 13.
Id.
Id. at 569, 214 A.2d at 17. The court specifically held that "where negligence
causes fright from a reasonable fear of immediate personal injury ... the injured
person may recover if such bodily injury or sickness would be regarded as proper
elements of damage had they occurred as a consequence of direct physical injury
rather than fright." Id.
68 48 N.J. 69, 222 A.2d 513 (1966).
69 Id. at 73-74, 222 A.2d at 515. The Caputzal court relied upon the general
elements of negligence "duty, and the breach thereof, and proximate, or legal,
cause of the injury ...... .Id. at 74, 222 A.2d at 516. The court accepted the
following formula: "liability should depend on the defendant's foreseeing fright or
shock severe enough to cause substantial injury in a person normally constituted,
thus then bringing the plaintiff within the 'zone of risk.' " Id. at 76, 222 A.2d at 517
(citation omitted).
70 Id. at 72, 222 A.2d at 514.
71 Id. at 74, 222 A.2d at 517.
72 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
73 Id. at 423, 404 A.2d at 10.
74 Id. at 433, 404 A.2d at 14.
65
66
67
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that the defendant physician negligently failed to inform them of
the availability of amniocentesis and the potential risk of birth
defects.75 Recognizing that psychological harm is an injury separate from physical injury, the court decided that emotional distress damages were recoverable. 76
The court further
acknowledged that the special77circumstances involved supported
the genuineness of the claim.

The significance of recognizing emotional distress as a distinct injury was further analyzed in Portee v. Jaffee. 78 In Portee, a
mother witnessed her child's suffering and subsequent death
when her son became trapped in an elevator shaft. 79 The court
was presented with the novel issue of whether liability for negligent conduct should be extended to include the emotional
trauma sustained by a person who witnessed the accident but was
not in any danger of personal harm. 80 In holding that such injuries were actionable, the court determined that the appropriate
standard would be reasonable foreseeability rather than the more
tenuous zone of risk requirement. 81
While the law in NewJersey remains in a state of flux on the
issue of compensation for emotional distress,82 some jurisdic
75

Id.

See id., 404 A.2d at 15.
77 Id., 404 A.2d at 14. In his separate opinion, Justice Handler discussed the
unique nature of parenthood as constituting a special circumstance supporting the
genuineness of the claim. Id. at 438-40, 404 A.2d at 17-18 (Handler,J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
78 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 522 (1980).
79 Id. at 91,417 A.2d at 522-23. Police officers tried for over four hours to rescue the child. Id., 471 A.2d at 522. During this time, the child's mother "watched
as her son moaned, cried out and flailed his arms. Much of the time she was restrained from touching him, apparently to prevent interference with the attempted
rescue.... He died while still trapped, his mother a helpless observer." Id., 417
A.2d at 522-23.
80 Id. at 90, 417 A.2d at 522. The court held that in order to maintain a cause of
action for negligent infliction of emotional distress the following elements must be
proven: "(1) the death or serious physical injury of another caused by defendant's
negligence; (2) a marital or intimate, familial relationship between plaintiff and the
injured person; (3) observation of the death or injury at the scene of the accident;
and (4) resulting severe emotional distress." Id. at 101, 417 A.2d at 528.
81 See id. at 95-96, 417 A.2d at 525. The court reasoned that the zone of risk
requirement was as arbitrary a standard as the former physical impact rule. Id. at
96, 417 A.2d at 525. Therefore, the court concluded that the "interest in personal
emotional stability is worthy of legal protection against unreasonable conduct." Id.
at 101, 417 A.2d at 528. The court further determined that it was reasonably foreseeable that a mother who witnesses the agonizing death of her child would suffer
emotional trauma. Id. at 95, 417 A.2d at 525.
82 See Portee, 84 NJ. at 101, 417 A.2d at 528 (rejecting the physical injury requirement in bystander cases); Berman, 80 NJ. at 433-34, 404 A.2d at 15 (noting the
76
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tions have permitted recovery for severe emotional distress
alone, without regard to resulting physical injury or illness.83
More significantly, a further judicial change appears to be taking
place in the area of emotional distress damages in toxic tort litigation. 84 Some courts have relaxed the physical injury i'equirement and have found that the element of physical harm is
satisfied when the plaintiff sustains injury to his immune system
caused by exposure to and ingestion of toxic chemicals.8 5
special factual circumstances of the case, physical manifestation of emotional distress not required). See also Strachan v.John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., 109 N.J.
523, 538 A.2d 346 (1988). In Strachan, the New Jersey Supreme Court recently
considered the issue of emotional distress damages. The plaintiffs suffered extreme emotional harm as a direct result of the defendant hospital's failure to release the body of their brain-dead son which the hospital kept connected to a
respirator for a period of three. days. Id. at 534, 538 A.2d at 351. While considering the issue of recovery for emotional distress without proof of physical manifestations of injury, the court declined to decide whether the "abandonment of the
physical injury requirement for emotional distress claims should extend to all 'direct' claims for emotional distress." Id. at 538, 538 A.2d at 353. The court's analysis reiterated the purpose of the physical injury requirement as a limitation on
fabricated claims, and further acknowledged the compelling evidence of emotional
distress in the present situation. Id. at 534, 537, 538 A.2d at 351, 353. However,
since the factual situation of Strachan was within the recognized exception for "negligent handling of a corpse," the court avoided a ruling which would permit recovery for emotional distress injuries not accompanied by physical manifestations. Id.
at 538, 538 A.2d at 353.
83 See, e.g., Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 929-30, 616 P.2d
813, 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 839 (1980) (abandoning the physical injury requirement of recovery for emotional distress since the jury could adequately determine
the validity and extent of emotional distress injury); Rodrigues v. State, 52 Haw.
156, 173, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (1970) (abolishing the physical injury requirement and
conditioning recovery upon the following standard: "serious mental distress may
be found where a reasonable man, normally constituted, would be unable to adequately cope with the mental distress engendered by the circumstances of the
case").
84 See S. BIRNBAUM & D. GROSS, PROOF OF CAUSATION AND DAMAGES IN Toxic
CHEMICAL, HAZARDOUS WASTE, AND DRUG CASES 425-426 (1987).
85 See, e.g., Barth v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 661 F. Supp. 193, 196 (N.D.
Cal. 1987) (immune system injury, resulting from exposure to toxic chemicals, was
held sufficient to satisfy requirement of physical injury on motion to dismiss); Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219, 1226-27 (D. Mass. 1986) (requirement of physical harm may be satisfied by subcellular harm and injury to the
plaintiffs' immune systems caused by their exposure to and ingestion of toxic chemicals).
Furthermore, recognition of recovery for emotional distress injuries without
resulting physical consequences has been justified in toxic tort cases on the theory
that the "impact" satisfied the physical injury requirement. Hagerty v. L & L
Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 318 n.l (5th Cir. 1986). In Hagerty, the plaintiff
was accidentally drenched with toxic chemicals. Id. at 316. The court found that
the plaintiff "did suffer a 'physical injury' from the drenching which constitute[d] an
'impact.'" Id. at 318.
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ENHANCED RISK OF DISEASE

Judicial uncertainty is even more apparent regarding the issue of damages for enhanced risk of disease. 86 It has long been
accepted that damages may be obtained for the future consequences of a present tortious injury.8 7 In an effort to avoid
awarding damages based on speculation and conjecture, the
courts have developed the standard of reasonable certainty.8 8
In Col v. Sherry,89 the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a
plaintiff was entitled to recover for the future consequences of an
injury if a reasonable probability of occurrence existed.90 The
plaintiff in Coll sustained injuries when the defendant's automobile negligently collided with his truck. 9 ' At trial, the plaintiff's
counsel was precluded from ascertaining, through expert medical
testimony, the probability of future surgery. 9 2 This was held to
be reversible error and the case was remanded for a new trial on
the issue of damages.9 3
In Laswell v. Brown,9 4 the mere possibility that the plaintiffs
86 See G. NOTHSTEIN, supra note 1, §§ 16.04-16.11, at 457-77.
87 See D. DOBBS, supra note 33, § 8.1, at 551; G. NOTHSTEIN, supra note 1,

§§ 17.06, 17.11, at 502-04, 510-11. See also Kimble v. Degenring, 116 N.J.L. 602,
604, 186 A. 451 (Sup. Ct. 1936) (stating that in a tort action, the measure of damages includes "the total physical injuries suffered-not merely those up to the time
of the trial, but also those prospective damages which can be estimated as reasonably certain to occur").
88 See G. NOTHSTEIN, supra note 1, § 17.02, at 495-97. The rule of reasonable
certainty "[p]ermits recovery of damages only for such future pain and suffering as
is reasonably certain to result from the injury received. To authorize recovery
under such rule for permanent injury, permanency of injury must be shown with
reasonable certainty, which is not mere conjecture or likelihood or even a
probability of such injury." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1138 (5th ed. 1979) (citations

omitted).
89 29 NJ. 166, 148 A.2d 481 (1959).
90 Id. at 175, 148 A.2d at 486. The court specifically ruled that "[i]f the prospective consequences may, in reasonable probability, be expected to flow from the past
harm, plaintiff is entitled to be indemnified for them." Id. See also Martin v. City of
New Orleans, 678 F.2d 1321, 1327 (5th Cir. 1982) (enhanced risk damages were
awarded where bullet lodged in neck would continue to present a risk of serious
future complications); Starlings v. Ski Roundtop Corp., 493 F. Supp. 507, 510
(N.D. Pa. 1980) (increased risk of arthritis was compensable as part of plaintiff's
knee injury award).
91 Coll, 29 N.J. at 169-71, 148 A.2d at 483-84.
92 Id. at 173-74, 148 A.2d at 485. Upon objection to the questioning of the
plaintiff's medical expert witness concerning the probabilities of necessary future
surgery and the recuperation period and expense of such surgery, the trial judge
stated that: "What the future may present this jury cannot speculate on." Id. at
174, 148 A.2d at 485.
93 Id. at 176-77, 148 A.2d at 486-87.
94 683 F.2d 261 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1210 (1983).
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would suffer future injury was insufficient to sustain their claim
for enhanced risk of disease. The plaintiffs in Laswell were children of a deceased serviceman who had been exposed to lowlevel radiation while on active duty in the army.95 The plaintiffs
sought damages for their alleged increased risk of latent cellular
or genetic defects. 96 The court of appeals affirmed the lower
court's dismissal of the claim, holding that the plaintiffs had not
sustained any present damages. 97 The court ruled that more
than "the mere possibility of some future harm" was required to
sustain a claim for damages. 98
The specific issues concerning enhanced risk of disease damages were addressed by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Evers v.
Dollinger.99 The defendant physician's misdiagnosis of Mrs. Evers' cancer resulted in a seven-month delay between the noticeable presence of her breast tumor and its subsequent surgical
removal.' 00 The plaintiff alleged in her complaint that the delay
in treatment caused by the defendant's misdiagnosis enhanced
the risk of cancer recurrence.' 0 ' The trial court refused admission of expert testimony on the issue of enhanced risk and directed a verdict in favor of the defendant at the close of the
plaintiff's case.' 0 2 The supreme court acknowledged that this
case presented an extraordinary set of circumstances in that by
the time it heard arguments on the case, Mrs. Evers' cancer had
recurred. 0 3 The New Jersey Supreme Court, in addressing the
issue of enhanced risk of disease damages, held that on remand,
Mrs. Evers should be allowed to demonstrate "within a reasonable degree of medical probability" that the delay increased her
95 Laswell, 683 F.2d at 262. The decedent participated in three nuclear bomb
tests while stationed in the South Pacific. Id.
96 Id. at 263. The children alleged that the harm sustained by their father was
genetically transferred to them. See id. All the children were born after their father's discharge from the army. Id.
97 See id. at 269.
98 Id.
99 95 N.J. 399, 471 A.2d 405 (1984).
100 Id. at 402-04, 471 A.2d at 407-08.
10 Id. at 404, 471 A.2d at 408.
102 Id. at 405-06, 471 A.2d at 408-09. In discussing the specific form of cancer
from which the plaintiff suffered, one medical expert opined that one out of four
patients would have a recurrence of the cancer. Id. at 405, 471 A.2d at 408. The
trial judge refused to admit the testimony into evidence determining that "the experts were unable to quantify the increased risk of recurrence of cancer." Id. He
ruled that "it has to be more probable than not or within a reasonable degree of
medical probability that, as a proximate result of any malpractice . . . [plaintiff]
would fall within the 25 percentile." Id.
103 Id. at 417, 471 A.2d at 415.
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risk of recurrence of cancer.' 4 While Evers recognized the legitimacy of damages for increased risk of disease when the risk had
materialized, the court avoided deciding the issue of abstract
risk. 105
A claim of recovery for abstract enlianced risk of disease was
rejected in Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp. 106 Devlin involved an ac-

tion brought by workers exposed to asbestos. 0 7 In denying the
enhanced risk of disease damage claim on the basis that it was
unquantifiable, the court maintained that the plaintiffs retained
their right to sue at a future time if they in fact, developed cancer
from such exposure. 08
A slightly different aspect of the enhanced risk of disease
claim was examined in Anderson v. W R. Grace & Co. 109 The plain-

tiffs in Anderson were exposed to and ingested toxic chemicals
found in their well water which was allegedly contaminated by
the defendants." 0 In seeking recovery for their enhanced risk of
disease, the plaintiffs asserted that their claims were merely an
element of compensable damages stemming from a present injury."' The court was willing to award the plaintiffs' general tort
law compensation but conditioned the recovery for future resulting harm on two factors: first, a "reasonable probability" that the
harm will occur, 1 2 and second, an accrual of a cause of action for
the future harm at the time compensation is sought. 1 3 The court
104

Id.

Id. More specifically, the court stated that the
plaintiff should be permitted to demonstrate, within a reasonable degree of medical probability, that the seven months delay resulting from
defendant's failure to have made an accurate diagnosis and to have rendered proper treatment increased the risk of recurrence or of distant
spread of plaintiff's cancer, and that such increased risk was a substantial factor in producing the condition from which plaintiff currently
suffers.

105 See id. at 406, 471 A.2d at 409. "[W]e need not determine whether the unquantified (and unquantifiable) but nevertheless certain increase in the risk, standing alone, is sufficient injury to sustain plaintiff's cause of action." Id.
106 202 N.J. Super. 556, 495 A.2d 495 (Law Div. 1985).
107 Id. at 559, 495 A.2d at 497.
108 Id. at 565, 495 A.2d at 500.
109 628 F. Supp. 1219 (D. Mass. 1986).
110 Id. at 1222. The defendants allegedly contaminated the ground water and
consequently the wells with toxic chemicals including trichloroethylene and tetrachloroethylene. Id.
11 Id. at 1230. Massachusetts law permits a plaintiff to recover for "all damages
that reasonably are to be expected to follow but not to those that possibly may
follow the injury which he has suffered." Id.
112 Id. at 1231.
113 Id. at 1230-31. Under present Massachusetts law, a cause of action accrues at
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thus perceived the issue as "whether, upon the manifestation of
one or more diseases, a cause of action accrues for all prospective
diseases so that a plaintiff may seek to recover for physically distinct and separate diseases which may develop in the future."" 4
In resolving this question, the court held that if the diseases
which the plaintiffs claimed to be at an increased risk of developing, "[were] part of the same disease process" as the illnesses
from which they were presently suffering, then damages for the
future disease would be recoverable upon "showing a 'reasonable probability' that they [would] occur."' "1 5 Further, the court
determined that if there was no connection between the future
diseases and the present illnesses, the plaintiffs' cause of action
would not accrue until the manifestation of the disease."16
. In Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corp.,"' the court viewed enhanced risk of disease as a present existing condition rather than
as a speculative future injury." 8 The defendant in Sterling operated a toxic chemical dump site which adjoined the plaintiffs'
property." 9 The chemicals deposited at the landfill infiltrated
the groundwater and ultimately polluted the water utilized by the
plaintiffs. 120 On the issue of liability, the court concluded that
Velsicol's activity was both "ultrahazardous" and "abnormally
dangerous," thereby subjecting the company to strict liability for
all damages. 12 1 In finding for the plaintiffs, the Velsicol court recthe time the disease manifests itself. Id. at 1231 (citing Olsen v. Bell Tel. Laboratories, Inc., 388 Mass. 171, 175, 445 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1983)).
114 Id. at 1231. See id. at 1227 n.4 (listing of the plaintiffs' present illnesses).
115 Id. at 1231.
116 Id. Relying on public policy, the court maintained that it would not be judicially sound to permit lawsuits on the speculation that a serious disease would manifest itself in the future. Id. at 1232 (quoting Gore v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc.,
17 Mass. App. Ct. 645, 648, 461 N.E.2d 256, 259 (1984)). A further justification
advanced by the court was the potential unfairness which would result by present
compensation. Id. The court reasoned that those who later developed the cancer
would have been undercompensated, while those who did not would receive a
windfall. Id.
'17 647 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Tenn. 1986).
118 Id. at 322. Scientific experts testified that "to a reasonable degree of scientific
certainty," each of the plaintiffs currently has a condition commonly referred to as
" 'enhanced or increased susceptibility' to disease." Id. at 321-22. These experts
further opined that the condition directly resulted from the consumption of contaminated water. Id. at 322.
'19 Id. at 308.
120 Id. at 311.
121 Id. at 315-16. The reasons advanced by the court for its imposition of strict
liability included:
1. There was a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or
chattels of others, particularly after the 1967 USGS report;
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ognized the present cellular damage and biological changes
caused by the ingestion, inhalation and contact exposure with the
genesis of the present condition of entoxic chemicals to be the
22
hanced risk of disease.'
IV.

MEDICAL SURVEILLANCE

Stemming from the claim for enhanced risk ofdisease is the
damage claim for medical surveillance Costs. 12 3 In Friendsfor All
2. There was a likelihood that the harm that results would be great,
such as the increased risk of many diseases including cancer, and the
destruction of plaintiffs' quality of life;
3. The inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
4. The extent to which the activity at the dump was not a matter of
common usage and as a means of disposal and violated the state of the
art;
5. The inappropriateness of the location of the dump where it was carried out; and
6. The extent to which its value to the community (none) was outweighed by its dangerous attributes (great).
Id. at 316. The court further determined that Velsicol's conduct was negligent. Id.
Additionally, the court found that Velsicol had trespassed on the plaintiffs' property and that by intentionally interfering with the plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of
their land, Velsicol's conduct created a nuisance. Id. at 319.
122 Id. at 322. The court attempted to explain the unique nature of the enhanced
risk of disease claim.
It is imperative at the outset to set forth the exact nature of the item
of damages commonly known as "increased susceptibility" or "increased risk." For once it is understood what that item of damages consists of, it becomes clear those damages are recoverable under
traditional principles of damage law ....
To begin with, it must be emphasized that the increased susceptibility to kidney and liver disease and cancer is a presently existing condition in each plaintiff who suffered exposure to the various toxins.
Plaintiffs produced scientific experts who testified, that, to a reasonable
degree of scientific certainty, each plaintiff now has a presently existing
condition known as "enhanced or increased susceptibility" to disease.
Finally, they testified that the condition resulted from consuming the
Velsicol chemicals in the water.
Id. at 321-22.
123 See G. NOTHSTEIN, supra note 1, § 17.11, at 510-11. See also C. MCCORMICK,
supra note 5, § 90, at 323-27 (damages include reasonable medical expenditures,
both past and future, which are the result of a demonstrated injury).
This traditional tort law damage rule has long been accepted by the New Jersey
courts. See, e.g., Shroeder v. Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 71, 432 A.2d 834, 842 (1981) (damages awarded for the future medical expenses required for a child with cystic fibrosis); Coll v. Sherry, 29 N.J. 166, 175, 148 A.2d 481, 486 (1959) (cost of future
operation held a proper element of damages); Work v. Philadelphia Supply Co., 95
NJ.L. 193, 196, 112 A. 185, 186 (1920) (recovery permitted for "such reasonable
outlay in the future as may be necessary [for plaintiff] to heal herself and her
injuries").
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Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 1 24 the court held that the
defendant's negligence proximately caused the need for medical
surveillance. 25 The plaintiffs in Friends for All Children were
Vietnamese orphaned children who survived a plane crash during "Operation Babylift."'' 2' The children endured decompression and loss of oxygen both of which could have potentially
caused brain damage. 127 The court addressed the issue of
whether the costs of diagnostic neurological examinations were
compensable without confirmation of other injury.128 In sustaining the claim, the court reasoned that the comprehensive
medical examinations would not have been necessary "but for"
which the children endured
the decompression and hypoxia
12 9
aboard the defendant's aircraft.

Compensation for future medical costs without the presence
of existing injury was similarly upheld in Hagerty v. L & L Marine
Services, Inc. 13 While on duty as a tankerman, Hagerty was
soaked with toxic chemicals due to an equipment malfunction
which occurred while loading chemicals onto a barge.131 Because
of the carcinogenic effect of the chemicals, Hagerty sought recovery for the costs of future periodic diagnostic tests and medical
examinations necessary to ensure early detection of a cancerous
condition.' 3 2 The court held that the claim for future medical
if
surveillance expenses could be included in a damage award
33
advisable.
medically
and
necessary
they were reasonably
746 F.2d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
Id. at 825. The court reasoned that the comprehensive medical examinations
would not have been necessary "but for" the decompression and hypoxia which the
children endured aboard the defendant's plane which ultimately crashed. Id.
126 Id. at 819. "Operation Babylift" was a mission undertaken during the final
days of the United States' presence in South Vietnam for the purpose of transporting Vietnamese orphans to the United States. Id.
127 Id.
124

125

128
129

Id. at 824.

Id. at 825. The court further concluded that the two principal tort law purposes of deterrence and compensation would be served by the recognition of the
claim as a proper element of damages. Id.
130 788 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1986).
131 Id. at 317. Hagerty was employed as a tankerman on a barge owned by L. &
L. Marine Services, Inc. Id. The chemical which completely drenched Hagerty was
dripolene, a chemical containing toluene, benzene and xyolene. Id.
132 Id. at 319. Presently, Hagerty does not have cancer, nor has he exhibited any
physical manifestations of cancer symptoms. Id. at 317. The physical symptoms
immediately resulting from his exposure consisted of a brief episode of dizziness
and leg cramps, followed a day later by a stinging sensation in his extremities. Id.
133 Id. at 319. The court further acknowledged the validity of the claim under the
"avoidable consequences rule," since a plaintiff is required to obtain medically recommended treatment so that any future recovery for a condition, which could have
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The necessity of future medical monitoring for early detection of disease was acknowledged by the court in Barth v. Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co. 134 as a significant justification for imposing liability on a defendant. 135 The plaintiffs in Barth instituted suit
against their employer, the Firestone Tire & Rubber Company,
seeking recovery for injuries caused by exposure to various
chemicals used in the manufacture of its tires.' 3 6 The specific re37
lief sought included the creation of a medical monitoring fund.
Noting the irreparable harm that may result from the postponetreatment, the court recognized the claim
ment of diagnosis and
38
for equitable relief.'
Ayers v. Township ofJackson 139 marks the New Jersey Supreme
Court's attempt to reconcile traditional tort law damage principles with the unique circumstances presented in toxic tort litigation.' 40 The Ayers court analyzed the plaintiffs' damage claims for
diminished quality of life, emotional distress, enhanced risk of
disease and medical surveillance costs in conjunction with the
limitations imposed by the New Jersey Tort Claims Act. 4 '
In examining the plaintiffs' claims for diminished quality of
life damages, the court acknowledged that such claims were
within the categories of compensation created for a private nuisance.' 42 Furthermore, the court concurred with the appellate
court's conclusion that the discomfort and inconvenience endured by the plaintiffs resulted from the interference with their
right to obtain uncontaminated water from their wells.' 43 The
been avoided or alleviated, would not be barred. Id. For a discussion of the avoidable consequences rule, see D. DOBBS, supra note 33, § 3.7, at 186-91 and C. McCORMICK, supra note 5, § 36, at 136-37.
134 661 F. Supp. 193 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
135 See id. at 205.
136 Id. at 195. The plaintiff and others like him were exposed to benzene as well
as other heavy metals. Id.
137 Id. at 203. One purpose of the fund would be the collection and dispersement of information concerning the potential diseases relating to the specific chemicals to which the plaintiffs were exposed. Id.
138 See id. at 203-05. See also In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp.
1396 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 818 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1987) (creation of a fund for
distribution of settlement).
'39 106 N.J. 557, 525 A.2d 287 (1987).
140 See id. at 587-88, 525 A.2d at 302-03.
141 See id. at 565, 525 A.2d at 291.
142 Id. at 571, 525 A.2d at 294. The court determined that the plaintiffs' diminished quality of life was directly associated with damage to their property. Id.
These damages represented a distinct interference with the use and enjoyment of
the plaintiffs' property. Id. at 571-72, 525 A.2d at 294.
143 Id. at 570-71, 525 A.2d at 293-94.
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court also agreed with the appellate division's conclusion that the
inconvenience and disruption of the plaintiffs' lifestyles were not
a type of pain and suffering ordinarily barred by the New Jersey
Tort Claims Act."' In interpreting the statutory language, the
court ruled that the intention of the Act was not to prohibit
claims associated with the interference of an interest in property,
but was rather aimed at limiting the recovery for pain and suffering associated with personal injuries.' 4 5 Accordingly, the court
affirmed the judgment awarding compensation for the dimin14 6
ished quality of life.
In evaluating the plaintiffs' request for emotional distress
damages,17 the court first qualified emotional distress as being
within the New Jersey Tort Claims Act's definition of injury. 14 8
The court acknowledged that New Jersey case law has eliminated
the physical impact requirement for recovery of emotional dis144 Id., 525 A.2d at 294. The bar against recovery for pain and suffering was
interpreted by the court "to apply to the intangible, subjective feelings of discomfort that are associated with personal injuries." Id. at 571, 525 A.2d at 294. See also
supra note 27 (discussing the New Jersey Tort Claims Act's limitation on recovery
for pain and suffering).
145 Ayers, 106 N.J. at 571, 525 A.2d at 294. The property interest invaded by
defendant's conduct was the right of the plaintiffs to obtain drinkable running
water from their own wells. Id. at 570-71, 525 A.2d at 293-94. The appellate division, in rejecting the township's assertion that the plaintiffs' aggravation, discomfort and annoyance, caused by the loss of their water supply, was a form of "pain
and suffering," concluded that a clear distinction existed between
the subjectively measured damages for pain and suffering, which are not
compensable by the Tort Claims Act, and those which objectively affect
quality of life by causing an interference with the use of one's land
through inconvenience and the disruption of daily activities.
Ayers v. Township ofJackson, 202 N.J. Super 106, 118, 493 A.2d 1314, 1320 (App.
Div. 1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 106 N.J. 557, 525 A.2d 287 (1987).
146 Ayers, 106 N.J. at 572, 525 A.2d at 294.
147 Id. at 572-77, 525 A.2d at 294-97. Many of the plaintiffs testified that they
experienced feelings of fear, anxiety and depression because of the knowledge that
they were exposed to and ingested contaminated water for a long period of time.
Id. at 572, 525 A.2d at 294.
In support of the legitimacy of their emotional distress injuries, the plaintiffs
presented, as an expert witness, a clinical psychologist who had conducted psychological testing on 88 of the plaintiffs. Id. at 573, 525 A.2d at 295. The expert testified that the sample group "manifested abnormally high levels of stress,
depression, health concerns and psychological problems." Id. She further opined
that these psychological conditions "were causally related to the contamination of
plaintiffs' water supply." Id.
148 Id. at 575, 525 A.2d at 296. The New Jersey Tort Claims Act defines injury as
"death, injury to a person, damage to or loss of property or any other injury that a
person may suffer that would be actionable if inflicted by a private person." N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 59:1-3 (West 1982).
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tress. 14 9 The court further recognized that the Act prohibits recovery for "pain and suffering" associated with any injury and is
not limited to the pain and suffering stemming from purely physical injuries.150 In construing the Act's meaning of "pain and suffering," the court relied on the legislative intent to limit the
liability of government entities.' 5 ' The court posited that the
legislature, in accord with this policy, specifically prohibited compensation for the non-objective elements of damages, such as
pain and suffering. 1 52 The court concluded that the symptoms
experienced by the plaintiffs, such as depression, stress, and anxiety constituted "pain and suffering" consequential to their emotional distress injury. 53 Interpreting the statutory definition of
injury to include emotional distress, 1 54 and concluding that the
plaintiffs' symptoms were equivalent to pain and suffering resulting from such injury,' 55 the court resolved the issue of emotional
distress damages by holding that recovery for such damages was
15 6
barred by the Act.
In analyzing the damage claims for enhanced risk of disease,
the court recognized the necessity of a legislative resolution of
15 7
the distinct problems associated with toxic exposure cases.
The court acknowledged that absent statutory intervention, the
158
issues necessitated application of conventional tort remedies.
Noting the obstacles confronting litigants in toxic chemical exposure cases, 1 59 the court declared that the discovery rule was an
149 Id. at 574, 525 A.2d at 295.
150

See id.

151 Id. at 574-75, 525 A.2d at 295-96. Since "pain and suffering" was not specifi-

cally defined in the Act, the court ascertained its meaning by examining the legislative purpose and intent. Id. at 576, 525 A.2d at 296. The policy judgments in
support of limited governmental liability reflect the economic burdens which face
public entities. Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:9-2 comment (West 1982)).
152 See id. at 576, 525 A.2d at 296.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 575, 525 A.2d at 296.
155 Id. at 576, 525 A.2d at 296.
156 Id. at 577, 525 A.2d at 297.
157 Id. at 581, 525 A.2d at 299. Congress created the Superfund Study Group, 42
U.S.C. § 9651 (e) (1982) to research the unique difficulties associated with compensation of toxic-tort injuries. See Zazzali & Grad, supra note 2, at 464. The Group
recommended a no-fault fund similar to the workmen's compensation laws. Id. at
464-65. To date, however, none of the Group's proposals have been adopted.
Ayers, 106 N.J. at 580-81, 525 A.2d at 299.
158 See Ayers, 106 N.J. at 581, 525 A.2d at 299 (citing Ginsberg & Weiss, Common
Law Liability For Toxic Torts: A Phantom Remedy, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 859, 920-30
(1981)).
159 Id. at 581-83, 525 A.2d at 299-300. These obstacles include: the identification
of the responsible party; the possibility that the accountable individuals are judg-

1989]

NOTE

295

appropriate device to remedy the problems presented by the personal 0injury statute of limitations and the single controversy
6

rule. 1

The court acknowledged that proof of causation was the major hindrance facing toxic tort plaintiffs.' 6 ' After studying the
obstacles which would confront plaintiffs if they were forced to
litigate a claim twenty to thirty years after the actual tortious conduct, the court proceeded to analyze the enhanced risk of disease
claim in conjunction with the provisions of the Tort Claims
Act.' 62 The court concluded that exposure to toxic chemicals
which causes an increased risk of disease was undoubtedly an
ment-proof; the litigation expenses associated with complex multi-party actions
and compensation of specialized expert witnesses; and procedural obstacles including statutes of limitation and the single controversy rule. Id.
160 Id. at 582-83, 525 A.2d at 299-300. New Jersey's discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations until discovery of the injury and the facts indicating that a third
party may be accountable. Id. at 582, 525 A.2d at 300.
The court noted that in toxic substance exposure cases, the state statutes of
limitation for personal injury and property damage have been pre-empted by federal legislation which provides that the statute does not begin to run until "the date
plaintiff knew (or reasonably should have known) that the personal injury or property damages . . . were caused or contributed to by the hazardous substance ...
concerned." Superfund Amendments and Authorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-499, 100 Stat. 1613, 1695-1696 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9658 (Supp. V 1987)).
The court posited the inapplicability of the single controversy rule to toxic tort
claims since the "cause of action does not accrue until the disease is manifested;
hence, it could not have been joined with the earlier claims." Ayers, 106 N.J. at 583,
525 A.2d at 300.
161 Id. at 585, 525 A.2d at 301 (citing Note, The Inapplicability of Traditional Tort
Analysis to Environmental Risks: The Example of Toxic Waste Pollution Victim Compensation,
35 STAN. L. REV. 575, 583-84 (1983)).
A compelling discursive on the issue of causation in toxic tort litigation was
given by Judge Jenkins in Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247 (D. Utah 1984),
rev'd on other grounds, 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987), a case involving the causal
connection between nuclear fallout and cancer.
The great length of time involved .. . allows the possible involvement of
"intervening causes," sources of injury wholly apart from the defendant's activities, which obscure the factual connection between the plaintiff's injury and the defendant's purportedly wrongful conduct. The
mere passage of time is sufficient to raise doubts about "cause" in the
minds of a legal system accustomed to far more immediate chains of
events.
Allen, 588 F. Supp. at 406.
162 Ayers, 106 N.J. at 591, 525 A.2d at 304. The court reexamined the Act's definition of injury which includes "damage to or loss of property or any other injury
that a person may suffer that would be actionable if inflicted by a private person."
Id. (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:1-3 (West 1982)). The court also looked to the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS which defines injury as "the invasion of any legally protected interest of another." Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 7(1) (1965)).
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63
"injury" under the Act.'
The court next addressed the issue of whether such injury
was compensable. 164 In so doing, the court contemplated the advantages and disadvantages of recognizing a cause of action for
an unquantified risk of disease.165 Irrespective of the difficulties
that would confront plaintiffs in future litigation, the court refused to award recovery based on the absence of evidence substantiating the occurrence of future harm. 6 6 The majority
reasoned that non-recognition of the enhanced risk claim was
most aligned with the legislative purpose in enacting'the New
67
Jersey Tort Claims Act.'

In considering the claim for medical surveillance costs, the
court relied on the expert testimony presented at trial which established that regular medical evaluations were reasonably neces163

Id. at 592, 525 A.2d at 305.

164 Id. at 592-96, 525 A.2d at 305-07.
165 Id. at 597-98, 525 A.2d at 307-08. The court reasoned that recognition of the
unquantified increased risk cause of action would require litigation and compensation for injuries which may never occur. Id. at 597, 525 A.2d at 308. Furthermore,
the court noted that juries would be burdened with the task of determining fair
compensation without clear guidelines, thereby resulting in arbitrary awards and
further escalation of insurance rates. Id. In addition to these disadvantages, the
court acknowledged that the denial of the cause of action may preclude recovery for
injured plaintiffs because of the difficulties of future litigation years after the exposure to toxic chemicals. Id. at 598, 525 A.2d at 308.
166 See id. at 598-99, 525 A.2d at 308. The court premised its decision on the fact
that the plaintiff's enhanced risk of disease was unquantified, and specifically reserved for a later time, the question of whether a valid cause of action for enhanced
risk of disease exists where the claim is supported by evidence establishing that the
occurrence of future disease is reasonably probable. Id.
167 Id. at 598, 525 A.2d at 308 (citing NJ. STAT. ANN. § 59:2-1 comment (West
1982) ("courts will exercise restraint in the acceptance of novel causes of action
against public entities")).
It is interesting to note that even though the New Jersey Supreme Court relied
upon the Tort Claims Act's limitation of public entity liability as a primary reason
for its non-recognition of the enhanced risk of disease claim, this holding has recently been extended by the appellate division to apply to private tortfeasors as
well. See Mauro v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 225 N.J. Super. 196, 542 A.2d
16 (App. Div. 1988). Mauro involved a claim for enhanced risk of lung cancer premised on a 15-20 year period of exposure to asbestos. Id. at 199, 542 A.2d at 17.
Plaintiff's medical expert testified that there was a "high probability" that he had an
enhanced susceptibility to cancer. Id. at 200, 542 A.2d at 18. In affirming the trial
court's rejection of this claim, the appellate division reasoned that the public policy
considerations advanced in Ayers, "expos[ing] the tort system, and the public it
serves, to the task of litigating vast numbers of claims for compensation based on
threats of injuries that may never occur" were also applicable in actions against
private defendants. Id. at 202, 542 A.2d at 19 (citing Ayers v. Township ofJackson,
106 N.J. 557, 597, 525 A.2d 287, 307 (1987)).
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sary for early detection and treatment of disease. 168 The court
found recovery for reasonable future medical expenses consis169
tent with both public policy and conventional legal remedies.
Additionally, the court determined that permitting recovery for
medical surveillance costs would serve two purposes: deterrence
of tortious conduct, and reduction of future liability costs by possibly mitigating or preventing future illnesses.' 7 0 In sustaining
the damage claim for medical surveillance costs, the majority relied most heavily on the public health interest of early detection
of diseases.' 7 ' Furthermore, the court opined that it would
clearly be unjust to require the plaintiffs to assume the medical
costs which would be unnecessary "but for" the defendant's tor72
tious conduct. 1

After recognizing a valid claim for medical surveillance expenses, the court discussed the modes of compensation. 73 The
majority determined that the payment of medical claims through
a court-supervised fund, rather than a lump-sum award, provided
a more effective and efficient method of compensating toxic tort
plaintiffs. ' 74 The court articulated the following advantages of a
court-supervised fund: the limitation of liability to amounts actually expended; the elimination of imprecise estimations of future
medical costs; and the assurance that the money would be used
75
as intended.

Despite its holding that the use of court-supervised funds
should be the general rule in litigation involving government defendants, the court declined to modify the jury award of damages
in this case. 176 Instead, the court concluded that the jury had
Ayers, 106 N.J. at 599, 525 A.2d at 309.
Id. at 603, 525 A.2d at 311.
Id. at 604, 525 A.2d at 311-12.
171 Id., 525 A.2d at 311.
172 See id. at 604-05, 525 A.2d at 312. The court held that the crucial factors to be
considered in determining the reasonableness of medical surveillance costs include
the extent of the exposure, the toxicity of the chemicals, the gravity of the potential
diseases, and the utility of early diagnosis. Id. at 606, 525 A.2d at 312.
173 Id. at 607-11, 525 A.2d at 313-15.
174 Id. at 608, 525 A.2d at 313.
The court premised this conclusion on the
unique factors associated with toxic exposure. See id. at 610, 525 A.2d at 314. The
fund would ensure that the money was actually used for medical costs and would
also limit the defendant's liability to actual expenditures. See id. In the long run,
the court reasoned that this restriction, placed on the plaintiff's recovery, would
best promote the public interests involved in toxic tort cases. See id. The court
further determined that a fund would eliminate the necessity of estimating future
medical costs. Id. at 609, 525 A.2d at 314.
175 Id. at 609-10, 525 A.2d at 314.
176 Id. at 610, 525 A.2d at 314-15.
168
169
170
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reached a reasonable verdict. 7 7 Moreover, since the fund mechanism represents a change in existing law, the court held that ap8
plication was limited to future litigation.17
Finally, the court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs'
claim under the Civil Rights Act of 1871.179 The plaintiffs al-

leged that the defendant's conduct was tantamount to an unconstitutional taking of their wells.' 80 The court relied on the recent
United States Supreme Court decision of Daniels v. Williams,'"'
which held that no deprivation of property exists under the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment when the injury to
property results from negligent rather than intentional conduct
82
of state officials.1

Justice Handler, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
asserted that the court overemphasized the inability of quantifying the risk and diminished the significance of the proven fact
of contamination.' 83 Justice Handler declared that denial of recovery, simply because damages do not adhere to precise measurement, constitutes a deviation from fundamental principles of
justice.'8 4 Examining the analogous claims of trespass, assault,
invasion of privacy, defamation, and emotional distress, the justice found the difficulties of formulating equitable damage compensation in those cases indistinguishable from the difficulties
85
presented by toxic tort claims.1

177 Id., 525 A.2d at 315. The relevant factors considered in determining the individual amounts of medical surveillance damages consisted of age, and duration and
degree of exposure to the toxic chemicals. Id.
178 Id. at 611, 525 A.2d at 315 (citing Coons v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.,
96 N.J. 419, 476 A.2d 763 (1984) (any change in existing law or new principle of
law is to be applied prospectively), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1123 (1985)).
'79 Id. at 612, 525 A.2d at 315 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)).
180 Id. at 611, 525 A.2d at 315.
181 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
182 Ayers, 106 N.J. at 612, 525 A.2d at 315 (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S.
327 (1986)).
183 See id. at 613, 525 A.2d at 316 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
184 Id. at 617, 525 A.2d at 318 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (quoting Schroeder v. Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 77, 432 A.2d 834, 846 (1981) (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[E]ven where the pitfalls of
measuring damages have been genuine, we have not refused to grapple with the
complexities in order to recognize the justness and fairness of relief."); Berman v.
Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 433, 404 A.2d 8, 15 (1979) ("[T]o deny ... redress for . ..
injuries merely because damages cannot be measured with precise exactitude
would constitute a perversion of fundamental principles ofjustice.")).
185 See Ayers, 106 N.J. at 617-18, 525 A.2d at 318 (Handler, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Justice Handler stated that when previously faced with
novel forms of injury, the courts have always developed standards, procedures, and
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Recognizing the enhanced risk of future disease as a present
injury, Justice Handler posited that the plaintiffs' risk of developing cancer and other related conditions was, at that point in time,
greater than the risk to persons not similarly exposed to toxic
pollutants.'8 6 Additionally, the justice asserted that the majority
failed to consider the long-term advantage of deterrence of negligent conduct which would be accomplished through present
compensation. 187 In accord with this reasoning, Justice Handler
rejected the majority's holding on the enhanced risk claim, concluding that it would have the effect of leaving injuries uncompensated and would excuse the negligence of tortfeasors.

18 8

Justice Handler further disagreed with the majority's ruling that a
court-supervised fund would provide the most appropriate
means of redress. 189 In his opinion, the court had deviated from
the established purpose of damage awards by placing restrictions
and conditions on the plaintiffs' recovery. 9 0 Justice Handler further posited that these limitations resulted in a discrimination of
the specific class of toxic tort plaintiffs.' 9 '
Adhering to the bounds of conventional tort law, the court
easily resolved the issue of diminished quality of life damages.
The court's task of redressing the plaintiffs' injuries became
more perplexing, however, when faced with the claims for emotional distress and enhanced risk of disease damages.
The court's analysis of the emotional distress claim is both
confusing in its reasoning and inconsistent with the trend of
prior case law. The court characterized the plaintiffs' emotional
distress as a separate and distinct injury caused by the defendant's conduct. 192 However, the court determined that the subjecformulas for determining equitable compensation. Id. at 618, 525 A.2d at 318
(Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
186 Id., 525 A.2d at 318-19 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). "The injury involved is an actual event: exposure to toxic chemicals....
Among the consequences of this unconsented-to invasion are genetic damage and a
tangible risk of a major disease, a peril that is real even though it cannot be precisely measured or weighed." Id., 525 A.2d at 319.
187 Id. at 619, 525 A.2d at 319 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (citing Weinberg v. Dinger, 106 N.J. 469, 486-87, 524 A.2d 366, 375 (1987)
(requiring tortfeasor to compensate for damage caused by his negligent actions
provides incentive for reasonable conduct)).
188 Id. at 620, 525 A.2d at 320 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
189 Id. at 622, 525 A.2d at 321 (1987) (Handler,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 575, 525 A.2d at 296.
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tive symptoms experienced by the plaintiffs, such as depression,
anxiety, fear and stress, were actually "pain and suffering" resulting from their emotional distress injury, for which recovery was
barred under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act. 19 3 The court's
recognition of emotional distress as a separate injury, while denying recovery for the manifestations of that injury, was wholly illogical in that it failed to acknowledge the subjective nature of
emotional distress in general. In addition, the court provided no
guidance concerning what types of objective symptoms would be
required to substantiate a claim for emotional distress. This
omission leaves unresolved the question of whether recovery
would be permitted under the Tort Claims Act for emotional distress injuries with related physical symptoms.
The court's holding also marks a departure from the current
trend of New Jersey case law. The direction of the court has recently been towards a recognition of emotional distress injuries
without accompanying physical manifestations when the factual
circumstances evidence the genuineness of the claim.' 9 4 The
toxicity of the various chemicals, the prolonged exposure period
endured by these plaintiffs, as well as the seriousness of the potential diseases and the township's palpably unreasonable conduct clearly represent the type of special circumstances which
would support a claim for emotional distress regardless of any
accompanying physical injury.
The court similarly avoided the complexity of deciding fair
compensation for an enhanced risk of disease injury. The majority recognized enhanced risk as an injury separate from the actual
manifestations of disease. 19 5 The court's analysis of this issue,
however, focused on the notion of compensation for a future
event that may never occur, rather than concentrating on the theory of enhanced risk as a present injury. In so doing, it appears
that the court has allowed the difficulties of quantifying injury to
overshadow the primary purpose of tort law which is to compensate innocent victims for their injuries and to require those responsible to bear the cost.
The problem of calculating probabilities has consistently
been an area of contention between the fields of science and law.
The plaintiffs' toxicology expert was able to identify the various
health risks linked to each specific chemical to which the plaintiffs
193

Id. at 576-77, 525 A.2d at 296-97.

194 See supra notes 72-85 and accompanying text.
195 Ayers, 106 N.J. at 592, 525 A.2d at 305.
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were exposed. However, because the toxicologist was unable to
quantify the effect of the interaction of the various chemicals on
future disease manifestations, the scientific knowledge in this
area was deemed inadequate.' n This determination has the result of placing an impossible burden on toxic tort plaintiffs. The
court is, in essence, requiring scientific proof of the effect on
human health of innumerable possible combinations of chemical
substances. Scientific knowledge is not exact, however, it has
been indisputably established that prolonged exposure to toxic
chemicals significantly increases the risk of developing fatal diseases. Justice Handler, in his separate opinion, exemplified the
gravity of the injury when he stated that "[n]o person in her right
mind would trade places with any one of these plaintiffs."' 7
Furthermore, the court placed an unrealistic emphasis on
the fact that toxic tort plaintiffs would not be barred from litigating future claims if they actually developed the diseases. Those
plaintiffs who attempt to litigate twenty years or more after the
tortious event will be confronted with an almost insurmountable
burden of establishing causation. The Ayers case presented the
court with the opportunity to establish necessary standards and
guidelines which would make causation proofs in future claims
more manageable. The court, however, evaded the problem and
merely stated that legislative intervention in this area was
required.
The court's novel endorsement of the court-supervised
fund, as the predominant means of handling medical-surveillance
awards, represents a recognition of the extreme public health
and safety interests involved in toxic chemical exposure cases.
The fund not only ensures that individual plaintiffs will undergo
the necessary periodic medical examinations but also provides
for the compilation of clinical data regarding toxic -chemical exposure and latent disease development. Although the court-supervised fund places limitations on the plaintiffs' recovery and
deviates from established modes of compensation, the momentous public health interest present in toxic tort cases justifies the
minimal restrictions.
The obstacles in toxic chemical exposures cases encountered
by the court in Ayers will inevitably surface in future litigation. As
scientific knowledge in this area increases, judicial resolution of
196

Id. at 588-89, 598, 525 A.2d at 303, 308.

197 Id. at 621, 525 A.2d at 320 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part).
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these difficult issues will have to develop accordingly. Absent the
necessary statutory response, judicial resolution is required. The
court's deficiency in dealing with the critical issues presented in
this toxic chemical exposure case leaves the future of toxic tort
litigation solely in the hands of the legislature.
Kathleen B. Harden

